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Why It's Crazy for a Psychiatrist
to Talk About Insanity
Martin Blinder, M.D.*
Almost any psychiatrist, addressing his own medical colleagues, could enu-
merate the kind of disturbed individual who, without meaning to, might
commit a serious, gratuitous crime; ,and he could discuss the kinds of stress-
ful or noxious experiences likely to elicit such behavior, all without stirring
up controversy among his listeners. The diagnostic classifications of people
likely to breakdown in a criminal way, and the nature and mechanisms of
the stresses most likely to bring them to this critical point, psychiatrically
speaking, are rather well defined.
For example, there are people in this world who are psychotic.
Psychosis is a state of severe emotional and mental disorganization, char-
acterized by the displacement or distortion of reality by confusion, delusions
and hallucinations. A psychotic person, not hearing and seeing the same
things other people are, his thinking fragmented and twisted by his disease,
would likely have quite a bizarre notion as to the meaning of the activities
around him and of even his own acts. He could well commit a terrible
offense believing he was performing a great public service. It wouldn't take
much to set him off; psychosis is a highly personal and internal process
which often operates independently of environmental stimuli. The psychotic
might harm a benign acquaintance or perfect stranger who has innocently
and unknowingly become incorporated into his assailant's delusions.
There are paranoid personalities.
A paranoid individual, though able to reason in an orderly, non-psychotic
fashion, always begins from the delusional premise-indeed, an unremitting
conviction--hat he is being victimized by those around him. No amount
of persuasion can convince him otherwise. Utterly neutral situations are
perceived as hostile or threatening, and from these observations he proceeds,
* Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of California Medical School, San
Francisco, and Assistant Professor, Adjunct, University of California, Hastings College
of Law, San Francisco. This paper was prepared for presentation at the Conference on
Mental Health and the Law, the School of Law, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.,
January 20, 1974.
Catholic University Law Review
logically enough, to "defend" himself, often with tragic consequences. He
may consume himself in endless futile lawsuits or, exasperated and enraged
by his puzzled "tormentors," may "take the law into his own hands."
Then there are the people who are perhaps only a little bit crazy.
There are compulsive and cyclical neurotic disorders which affect men
and women rational in every way, save for an abiding and almost irresistable
preoccupation with a single aberrant thought or behavior pattern. The com-
pulsion may be to exhibit oneself sexually, to set pointless fires, to throw
away salaries and life savings in one disastrous gambling binge, or to shop-
lift items of no particular value. Someone with such a disorder is totally
committed-loyal-to his particular urge, and throughout his life is no more
likely to exchange it for another than he is to give it up. Some compulsive
behavior may incidentally be against the law, and this unpleasant fact may
be clear to the offender, yet helps little in his efforts to arrest his ceaseless
urges.
By way of contrast, there is hysterical disassociation, where an ordinarily
normal individual becomes so overwhelmed by stress or provocation that
reason abdicates: the conscious, controlling, judgmental part of his mind is
briefly overcome by the unconscious, automatic, instinctual part, which may
then discharge some antisocial, even violent impulse, unfettered by a need
to conform to, or even by an awareness of, the law. Minutes later, when
rationality and self-control return, the individual does not remember-
indeed disbelieves-what he has done. On a deep emotional level, he may
have "wanted" to do it (and possibly it may be reasonable to say of his
victim that he long deserved it). But the criminal act does not fit the of-
fender's makeup, and is not performed out of his conscious wishes. Usually,
he is as genuinely shocked as is everyone else by what he has done, and
is most unlikely ever to do anything like it again.
Likewise, trauma or intoxicants, notably alcohol, can totally incapaci-
tate a man who may then commit acts he would at other times reject. There
are other physical conditions of the brain which may produce aberrant and
unintended behavior: epilepsy sometimes takes the form of automatic, re-
petitive, antisocial behavior rather than the classic convulsive fit; and mental
retardation may cause a chronologically mature but intellectually defective
individual to make gross errors of judgment or succumb to childlike impulses
which place him in violation of the law.
Condensed in this fashion these descriptions sound a bit squeezed and de-
hydrated, but they are reasonable and straightforward. The great majority
of psychiatrists would accept them without protest. Nomenclature changes
a bit from place to place and from time to time, but the patients represented
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are Teal enough, and most psychiatrists will describe them in pretty much
the same way, whatever their "school" or treatment philosophy.
But bring 'any two psychiatrists into court and all hell breaks loose. When
a man's mental disability has expressed itself in crime and his legal sanity
is the issue, 'be prepared to extend the trial an extra week with protracted,
tedious, wordy 'battles in the courtroom about "sanity" versus "insanity,"
or what constitutes "diminished responsibility."
By and large, psychiatrists are uncommonly conscientious and honest;
what's more, left undisturbed in their quiet offices, far 'from the din of ad-
versary proceedings, they have little trouble agreeing amongst themselves as
to whether or not a man is crazy. In truth, almost anyone can tell readily
when an unfortunate fellow's ideas just don't hang together. We can tell
when he doesn't see or hear the same things everyone else does, when he
is in great emotional distress far out of proportion to any cause we can dis-
cover, or when 'he cannot even carry out his own definition of acceptable
behavior. When a defendant's mind lacks some basic cognitive elements or
has been in some other way significantly deranged, psychiatrists, attorneys,
judges and most jurors-indeed any reasonably alert observer-must sense
it quickly enough. If there is one thing to which we are sensitive, it is the
mental outsider, the one whose mind functions differently from ours. It
doesn't matter much if you label him "mentally ill," a "social misfit," "emo-
tionally maladjusted," or "mentally defective." Labels are simply verbal
conveniences. The man himself is real enough and -few of those exposed
to him for any length of time would disagree that there was something seri-
iously wrong with him. A happy, competent, well-adjusted individual
doesn't go about raping ten-year-old girls or risking a gun battle for the
fifty dollars in a grocer's till.
However, when called upon to discuss such behavior in the context of crime
and punishment, our heretofore perceptive, objective and agreeable psychia-
trists-and attorneys and jurors and citizen-observers-become partisans in
a philosophical struggle in spite of themselves. All of these definitions, classi-
fications and truths lose their self-evidence as psychiatrists, attorneys, jurors
and judges align themselves in adversary positions, adjusting the color and
shape of their perceptions to better fit their respective philosophies.
One position maintains that aberrant antisocial behavior is almost always
the result of mental, emotional or environmental disturbances, and that it
is error to perceive the offender as evil in the Biblical sense. Thus, it may
be argued that the man who deliberately, compulsively and repeatedly steals
for a living is acting in unconscious anger and compensation for severe child-
hood deprivation, and merits psychotherapy, not incarceration.
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The opposing philosophy permits the concession that, strictly speaking, a
given criminal is not psychologically normal, yet holds such abnormality to
be irrelevant. Criminal acts must be punished if we are to be fair to those
who obey the law, and if we are to provide any kind of deterrent to those
who would not. To acknowledge formally and explicitly that most criminal
acts do result from some kind of mental or emotional or social disability
would be tantamount to providing an excuse for all criminal behavior and
an escape from all punishment. Adherents to this position may well argue
that, whether deprived, compulsive, deranged, or not, if a man steals, know-
ing it is against the law to steal, he must go to jail.'
Picture the testimony at the trial of an alcoholic who, in delirium tremens,
killed a policeman he thought was an agent of the devil come to cart him
off :to hell-knowing (as he most certainly will admit) that it is against
the law to kill a cop.
Psychiatrists identifying with the first position invariably focus on the of-
fender's symptoms and those aspects of his behavior outside conscious con-
trol, declaring him "insane," or in some way legally non-responsible. Oppos-
ing testimony may concede some psychiatric symptoms, but, emphasizing the
coherent parts of his speech and behavior (and even a raving psychotic can
manifest some normal functions some of the time), would maintain that the
offender nonetheless is liable for his actions and legally "sane."
To the courtroom cauldron of law, medicine and philosophy are fre-
qently added emotions; when those taking the first view feel sorry for the
offender-misfit and wish to repair him, while those whose philosophy permits
punishment may be angry at him for what he has done and want his vic-
tim-society-justly avenged. Psychiatrists belonging to the first group are
comfortable describing the offender as having "a mental disease or defect."
Those in the second group are not, and often lost in the emotional and
semantic hue and cry is the central issue of whether or not, at the moment
of his offense, a particular offender had his wits about him.
I believe that the courts would do well to move toward halting psychiatric
testimony just short of the ultimate question of criminal responsibility, direct-
ing the expert simply to present to the trier of fact the kind of man the
defendant ihas been and is, his symptoms and their severity, what was going
on with him at the moment of his offense, and how the offender probably
1. Parenthetically, I might mention their other meritorious arguments-not directly
germane to the thrust of this address-that most people afflicted with such aberrations
nevertheless do not commit crimes; that vague, ill-defined labels implying mental illness
can be used not only to rescue the guilty, but also to isolate from due process and per-
manently incarcerate those whose only crime is social or political nonconformity.
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perceived his own actions at ,that time.2 This kind of information is useful
to judges and juries. They deserve to have it, if available, and defendants
have a right to have them hear it. Psychiatrists are skilled in gathering it up
and presenting it, and thus may rightfully be called to the stand, but should
be stopped from endeavoring to draw legal conclusions from their psychiat-
ric data, for here they may exceed their competence. 3
I believe the courts can well do without amorphous, almost indefinable
concepts like "chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia," and without epi-
thets like "psychopath" or "moral delinquent." Certainly they can survive
without psychiatric discourses on such legalisms as "insanity" or "diminished
capacity," or other constantly shifting abstractions remote from psychobio-
logical reality and outside the psychiatrist's expertise.
It is not the type of disorder, but its severity, pervasiveness and social
context that really determine what effect it is having on a man's ability
to function. A man's peers, once adequately informed, may be better able
to determine the significance and relevance of his disorder in his particular
community than any psychiatrist. So the latter, having completed his
lay-language portrait of the man, should put down his verbal brush, depart
the courtroom, and leave the jury to contemplate and name the painting-
to draw its own conclusions in the light of prevailing levels of understanding,
insight, compassion and anger in the community.
This is what the jury is going to do anyway, so why burden the judicial
process with such indefinables as "the mental capacity to form malice," or
with other deformed, grotesque congenitally defective children issuing from
the unhappy marriage of law and psychiatry? Admittedly, such unions are
inevitable and even necessary in our complex society, but the spouses-obvi-
ously mismated-should be discouraged from breeding.
2. Of course, the expert must be prepared to demonstrate how he was able
to gather such data, so the trier of fact can decide for itself how accurate or important
the data is likely to be.
3. A man can have a diseased condition-a broken leg, a cough, a headache-and
yet not be "ill." But when that condition is sufficiently generalized and systemic as
to affect his overall well-being or ability to function-as in calcium depletion, dissemi-
nated tuberculosis or brain tumor (even though his disease be that of the single organ)
-then we quite properly say that the man is "ill."
The same holds for psychiatric disorders. Our decision to call a man "mentally ill"
must reflect the overall effect his abnormality is having on his ability to function, irre-
spective of diagnosis. A city dweller with a phobia about vast open spaces, or a resi-
dent of a desert island who fears elevators, both may be classified psychiatrically, but
are hardly mentally ill. A smoker doubtless has-as most will admit-a serious prob-
lem of addiction, but again they should not be characterized as mentally ill unless their
need for tobacco is so strong that it contaminates and adversely affects major areas
of living.
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